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Industrial Policy and Environmental Regulation-Canada
John L. Howard*
INTRODUCTION

The phrase "industrial policy" immediately evokes concepts of overarching plans, grand strategies and common visions which, both in
government agencies and private corporations, quickly degenerated
from energizing doctrine, to platitudinous dogma and finally to discredited myth. Among all the prophets of human striving, few have
.summed up the issues more succinctly or more forcefully than Toynbee
in his A Study of History." Using as metaphors the Old Testament
trials of Job and Goethe's Faust, he argues persuasively that, in spite of
great individuals or pretentious grand designs, civilizations rise in response to existing challenges and fall when they lose the energy and
moral strength to respond to new challenges. The challenges arise
slowly and almost imperceptibly. They are rarely ever dramatic threats.
They are, rather, slow degenerative processes within complex systems
that often defy any convincing cause and effect analysis even long after
a civilization or nation has declined. That is what makes the metaphor
of Faust so appropriate. He is redeemed not because he has found any
ultimate answers as to what is right but because he never ceases to
strive to learn more about himself, his relationship with other individuals and the world around him. In a world where the only constant is
change, Faust strives his utmost to respond to constantly new challenges and in the process, to expand his knowledge of material things
and of the good moral life.2
This paper, therefore, rather than attempt to prescribe any grand
design, falls precipitately from the lofty metaphysics of Faust to the
more mundane world of international economic relations. Consistent
with the purposes of this Institute and the narrower goals of this conference, I shall summarize briefly what I assume is a desirable industrial policy and, on that foundation, attempt to explain the nature,
* Senior Vice-President, Law and Corporate Affairs, MacMillan Bloedel Limited, Vancouver, British Columbia.
1 ARNOLD TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY, chs. 10-13, (ab. ed., 1972).
2 For an excellent critique of Faust, see the Introduction in 1 ROE MERRILL HEFFNER ET AL.,
GOETHE: FAUST, 66-72 (U. of Wis. Press ed., 1975), where the editors describe Faust's internal
conflicts between material desires and spiritual demands, between action and contemplation, and
finally between nature and reason. These same inner conflicts, as they relate to the inner state, are
discussed with reference to Robert Unger's Knowledge and Politics in MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 64-74 (1987).
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functions, applications and real world limitations of trade and environmental regulation.
The specific thesis of this paper is that to superimpose in the existing system of discretionary trade regulation the value-driven vagaries
of environmental regulation would be, at best, to compound a felony.
While easily stated, that thesis requires an examination of the characteristics of fundamental institutions of governance that are too often
assumed - or assumed away - in question-begging arguments.
INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Although usually characterized as a technical issue concerning the
relationship between governments and producer organizations, underlying every individual's concept of a desirable industrial policy is an implied moral decision about social justice, specifically the redistribution
of wealth that motivates individuals to learn continuously and work effectively in any society.3 There is, therefore, no touchstone, only a balance, an inner tension that motivates people to do things.
In his recent book Head to Head, Lester Thurow, comparing
large economies,
concisely describes the generally perceived
4
alternatives .
Benchmarking reveals a variety of foreign models. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) orchestrates the development of a game plan in Japan. In Germany the large industrial
banks, among them, the Deutsche Bank, are the conductors of the
economic orchestra. Government-owned firms play a key role in
France. But none of these foreign systems could easily be grafted onto
the U.S. system. America is going to have to find a uniquely American way to develop a game plan.
The problem is that these are only perceptions. Ohmae convincingly argues that "Japan Inc." is an American invention and has little
to do with Japanese industrial reality.' And recent events make clear
that Germany and France have no "game plan" that ensures continuous success. What they do have in common, however, is a rigorous,
comprehensive education system and a wealth transfer system that give
individuals and corporations a sense of security that enables them to
work on a basis of cooperation rather than constructed conflict toward
long-term goals. Indeed, notwithstanding superficial conflicts among
them, Ohmae, Reich and Thurow tend generally to come to that same
conclusion.6
See ROBERT REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 255-82 (1983).
• LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD 291 (1992).
' KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD 193-210 (1990).
6 Id. at 11-13, 175-81; ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 268-81,
THUROW, supra note 4, at 298-99.
'

*301-02 (1991);
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Ohmae states the central points extremely well:
"When money, goods, people, information and even companies crisscross national borders so freely, it makes no sense to talk of 'American industrial competitiveness? The only thing is that IBM competes
with DEC and Fujitsu."'
And he also points out with respect to the role of government:
If you look for an industry that has made its mark for a sustained
period of time because of continuing government subsidies or guidance, you will look for a long time. Such industries often become docile because they lose touch with the competitive realities of the world.
Government can stimulate, facilitate and even foster the growth of
certain industries. This is true of American venture capital and Japanese semiconductors and robots.8
He adds, however, that the government functions did not develop
the individual entrepreneurs or direct the highly motivated individuals
who produced those products and services successfully. Thus "national
competitiveness" is largely an anachronism. What counts is people and
their ability, through education and teamwork, to add value to goods
that global customers are willing to buy.9
There is, therefore, a relatively broad consensus even among writers from different nations and with different values as to what are the
ends and means - and limits - of industrial policy. But that consensus
impliedly requires some analysis and change, even radical change, of
some of our fundamental institutions. The discussion below attempts to
set out succinctly a framework for such analysis and then proceeds to
explain the extraordinary impact of trade and environmental
regulation.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Any explanation of trade and environment regulation requires, as
a point of departure, some analysis of the concepts of the basic institutional arrangements that distinguish political systems. In this broad
context, the institutions of special importance are property ownership
note 5, at 199.
Id. at 198.
9 At the level of the firm, the same principles obtain. There is no "best model" of management that can be adopted. What counts is the continuous learning of a firm's employees at all
levels which enables the firm constantly to respond successfully to new challenges. See PETER
7 OHMAE, supra

8

9-16
(1990).
At the national level in Canada these same conclusions are reached in two separate reports,
see, MICIlAEr PORTER & THE MONITOR COMPANY, CANADA AT THE CROSSROADS (1991); ALAN
RUGMAN & JOSEPH D'CRUz, KODAK CANADA, INC, NEW VISIONS FOR CANADIAN BUSINESS:
SENGE.THE FiFrH DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION

STRATEGIES FOR COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(1990).
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and the political organisms having power to decide policy, the agencies
that administer and enforce that policy, the courts in their role of reviewing administrative discretion exercised by those agencies, and the
market. Table 1 sets out the distinguishing characteristics of modern
political systems.
TABLE 1
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTIONS
Political System

Ownership
of means of
production.
Power to
control
production.

Capitalist
Private (but
usually some
public
ownership)
Private
(market
interaction,
subject to
market
regulation,
ostensibly to
remedy market
failures)

New
Pluralist
Private (but
usually some
public
ownership)

Corporatist
Private
(but usually
some public
ownership)

Private
Public
(market
(bureaucratic
interaction,
planning and
subject to
programming by
market and
a corporatist
interest group body - e.g.,
driven social
labour,
regulation
industry and
that is
government,
frequently
exercising
command/
command/
control
control power)
regulation)

Socialist
Public

Public
(bureaucratic
planning in a
pure command/
control system)

Although both the United States and Canada flirted with corporatist structures to direct the economy in the 1930s, in both jurisdictions the controversial statutes were struck down as unconstitutional,
compelling both governments to seek other solutions. 10 What evolved
with institutional variations in both countries1 were a number of hybrid institutions that are essentially an analogue of the commissions
long used in North America to regulate public utilities, that is, "independent" agencies having broad powers to decide policy issues and to
implement those policies through the exercise of administrative, adjudi-

cative and rule-making powers. The purpose of such agencies, in con10 An

excellent history of the New Deal experiments is set out in

ANDREW SHONFIELD.

MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER
" For excellent analyses of the structures of and inherent problems connected

306-26 (1965).
with "independent" agencies in the context of Canada's parliamentary system (i.e., no separation of legislative
and executive powers), see Hudson Janisch, Policy Making in Regulation: Towards a New Definition of the Status of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Canada, 17 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 46
(1979); W.T. Stanbury, Direct Regulation and Its Reform: A CanadianPerspective, 1987 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 467, which describes in tabular form the full panoply of direct economic regulation in
Canada.
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trast to corporatist or socialist institutions, was not to displace the mar-

ket but rather to remedy market "failures" and so cause the market to
work better. In addition, each country continued to regulate through
already existing institutions designed to balance power between and institutionalize responsibility in private market actors, particularly business corporations and labor unions. The spectrum of regulatory techniques employed is set out in Table 2.
TABLE 2

TECHNIQUES OF ECONOMIC REGULATION

Regulatory
techniques to
remedy market
'failures'
(monopoly,
cartels, fraud)

Balancing power

Antitrust,
industrial
relations laws

Institutionalize
responsibility

Corporation
laws, union
laws, social
regulatory laws
that impose
liability on
officers and
directors.

-Setting

up
external agency
with power to
control
* structure
"entry
* conduct
* price
* exit
in a market
sector

Utilities,
transportation,
communications,
financial markets.

During the last fifty years both the Canadian and United States
governments have acquired more experience and better insight into the
advantages - and pitfalls - of regulated markets that have been administered through external agencies. Although actual administration
sometimes differs widely between the two countries and even from
agency to agency within one country, it is possible to posit a hypothetical model and to compare with it the elements of regulatory systems in
the United States and Canada, thus emphasizing the institutional differences between the two countries. Those material differences are
highlighted in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF REGULATION - INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
Model
(1) Statutory
delegation to an
agency of powers
to prescribe and
implement
policy

U.S.

(2)

Adjudicated cases
and rule-making

Adjudicated cases and
rule-making (and also, in some
cases, executive regulationmaking power).

Yes

Yes

Policy making

Agency outside
'partisan' politics.

Canada
Because of lack of separation of
powers doctrine, there is much
less separation between the
agency and the executive, indeed,
statutes frequently provide for
executive override of agency
decisions.

(3) Constraints on
agency powers
" Judicial
review of
decided cases
" Judicial
review of
rule-making
" Executive
control over
appointments
" Legislative
oversight by
statutory
amendment

The obvious distinguishing feature of the two systems relates to
the delegation of power to an agency. Since the executive is never separate from the legislature in Canada, a truly "independent" agency simply is not feasible. 2 Less obvious, but probably more insidious, is the
lack of effective constraint on the rule-making powers of departments
or agencies. While such centralization of power in the executive tends
to autocratic decision-making, the power is tempered by tension between the independent agency and the executive, which will override
the agency only in cases that are to the government of extreme political
significance. Clearly, to use an override power to veto an agency policy
decision, if it even remotely implies partisan political intrusion into a
publicly administered system, will elicit a sharp confrontation with the
11See

Janisch, supra note 11.
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opposition in the legislature. There is, therefore, some merit in the system in the sense it "depoliticizes" or removes from the partisan policy
arena more routine agency policy-making and administration. Moreover, as in the U.S., it is a useful technique to shelter the executive
from responsibility for controversial but necessary administrative decisions that have no partisan implications. In retrospect, if one assumes
economic regulation is in fact required, the U.S.. and Canadian commission is an innovative and, from a political point of view, useful institution. The truly difficult problems arise, however, when we shift from
economic regulation to social regulation as described in Table 4.
TABLE 4
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REGULATION
Balancing power
Indirect
Institutionalizing
-responsibility

-Economic
regulation
(competitive
markets)

-Direct

Regulation -

-

-

Social
regulation
(planning
where there
is no market)

Constraints on
market actors:
" structure
"entry
" pricing
" conduct
" exit

Environment

-Workplace safety
Employment equity
Consumer protection
National culture

Market regulation ostensibly occurs because markets fail. Social
regulation occurs because there is no market. As a result, there is no

322
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existing institution that can be regulated to cause it to achieve desired
public goals such as environmental protection, marketplace safety and
employment equity. The only program instrument available is planning,
buttressed by command/control, to compel market actors to do or not
to do certain things. Social regulation, therefore, is not just an extension of market regulation. It takes us through the looking glass into a
planning world that is not just different from but utterly inconsistent
with the operation of a market economy. In the U.S. it has led to some
uncharacteristically autocratic governance but has been tempered by
sophisticated separation of powers doctrine which confines the more
outrageous commands of social program administrators. In Canada,
however, where the legislature and executive are designedly not separated, the planning or command/control systems apply without any institutional constraint other than the desire of the elected government to
continue in power. And since responsibility for specific bad decisions
tends to become diffused or even lost in the election process, the Canadian system tends to excesses that inhere in any bureaucratic planning
system. This is best illustrated by a comparison of U.S. and Canadian
environmental laws. A comment by a leading writer on U.S. environmental law brings this comparison into sharp perspective.
Because of the high level of activity in the field, and because of the
complex nature of the area, decisions with environmental implications
now make up the majority of administrative law decisions in the federal courts, and, in consequence, the leading course books on administrative law could probably be adopted quite easily to teach a course in
environmental law.' s
In contrast, in Canada, there is virtually no administrative law relating to any substantive environmental issues." Environmental standards are prescribed by rules - usually quantitative rules - that are not

subject to judicial review. In short, the Canadian system reflects planning carried to its logical, ultimate end. This contrast is so striking it
warrants more detailed explanation.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

Since 1970 governments have been pressed to extend the concept
of economic regulation to deal with broad social issues such as consumer protection, equal employment opportunity and protection of the
environment. Indeed, the phrase "environmental regulation" connotes
that the function is, if not parallel to economic regulation, at least an
:'

FRANK GRAD,

1 TREATISE

ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

1-7 (1973, Cum. Supp. 1992).

There has been considerable litigation concerning which level of government, federal or
provincial, has jurisdiction over the preparation of an environmental impact statement in specific
'4

cases, but that concerns only the application of a bureaucratic procedure, not any dispute over a
case decision or a rule.
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analogical extension of it, permitting government to assign the function
to an agency insulated from the pressures of short-term, partisan politics. But that is clearly not the case. It is in fact a planning system that
public administrators, exercising broad statutory authority, superimpose on market actors. The public administrators may have some regard for the effect on the competitive position of each firm but are not
subject to any express standards that confine their discretion in accordance with the economic regulation model.
The vanguard statute was the U.S. National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"), which came into force on January 1, 1970. It established the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), the predecessor1 5 of the Environmental Protection Agency, and authorized it to collect information, review and appraise existing federal programs,
conduct investigations and research, and recommend national policies.16
The CEQ introduced the North American system of environmental
regulation through the devices of the Environmental Impact Assessment ("EIA") and the Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"). 17
Specific statutes, such as the Clean Water Act of 1977, complete the
regulatory system, setting out general standards (e.g., "best available
technology economically achievable") and authorizing administrators
to issue permits that in effect grant an exemption from those
standards."'
From its inception NEPA was understood to be very different
from other regulatory systems. One especially knowledgeable commentator describes the enactment of NEPA as taking place in a "crisis

atmosphere" based on the premise that "the market economy cannot be
trusted to control its own externalities of production. National planning
was proposed and, to an extent, accepted as a solution." 1 9 Nevertheless,
in the United States, the statutes were drafted to parallel the economic
regulation model, setting out express but general standards to confine
the discretion of administrators in accordance with the direction of
"5
See

BNA

STAFF,

U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS

3 (1988 ed.).

18 National Environmental Policy Act § 42, USC § 4344.
17 The concepts of the Environmental Assessment and the Environmental Impact Statement
are set out in the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations promulgated as "guidelines"

under NEPA to regulate the activities of U.S. federal agencies. The final guidelines are set out in
38 Fed. Reg. 20, 550 (1973); see also BNA STAFF, The Environmental Impact Statement Process, Corporate Practice Series No. 27 B-401 (updated April 1989).

The B.C. counterpart is the environmental impact assessment provision set out in the Environment Management, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 110.5, s. 3. The B.C. Legislature is currently considering a replacement law, the proposed Environmental Assessment Act, Bill 32, introduced in June
1993.
18 See Clean Water Act, 33 USC §§ 1311 &1341 if.
19 W. Ruckelshaus, Preface to BNA STAFF, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS Xxxvi (1988 ed.).
"Externalities" in this context means any adverse impact on a publicly owned good such as air or

water by, e.g., an industrial firm or farming operation.

324

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:315 1993

courts reviewing impugned administrative decisions. Not surprisingly,
the social regulation laws, and particularly the environmental laws,
evoked a large volume of litigation. 20 The remedies sought are generally the particularly appropriate administrative remedies of injunction
or compliance order. 1
The Canadian regulatory model, as shown in Table 3, differs from
the U.S. model in two key respects. First, there are in the Canadian
laws few if any workable statutory standards that permit effective judicial review. The Fisheries Act, for example, declares it is an offense to
"deposit" a "deleterious substance" in "water frequented by fish", unless, in effect, permitted by the regulations.2 2 Second, the regulationmaking process is immune from judicial review in Canada. As a result
we have extraordinary power delegated to the executive to determine
the conduct standard, any breach of which can give rise to a penal
accusation that bears all the opprobrium of a breach of a criminal law,
that is, of some fundamental moral rule. Moreover, for constitutional
reasons2 1 the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, for example, relies even more heavily on criminal law characterization to deal with
toxic substances, nutrients added to waterways, federal government
agencies, international air pollution, and ocean dumping.24
The British Columbia law adheres in form more closely to the
traditional Canadian administrative law model summarized in Table 3.
Waste Management Act §3(1.1) states a strict standard prohibiting introduction into the environment of any waste generated by an industry
or business. Reinforcing that provision, §(1.2) prohibits the introduction into the environment of waste produced by any activity or operation. But, true to the character of environmental laws, both prohibitions
are subject to a number of exceptions, including especially the introduction of waste in accordance with a permit issued under §8. The issue of a permit however, does not depend on any measure of technological or economic feasibility. Instead a manager is empowered to issue a
permit "subject to requirements for the protection of the environment
that he considers advisable". A decision made under that provision is
subject to appeal under §27(1), but given the absence of express substantive standards in §8 it is difficult to conceive of any ground of appeal other than a breach of due process rules or breach of a vague,
20 See BNA STAFF, Introduction to U.S. Environmental Laws 3-6 (1988 ed.). Since its enactment in 1970 the U.S. federal law, which included federal agencies, evoked from federal agencies alone some 22,000 EISs and has been the subject of some 1800 legal actions in the 1970-85
period, most brought by interest groups seeking to compel government agencies to prepare EISs.
21 See BNA STAFF, supra at A-28-30, which comments on litigation in connection with EISs.

Fisheries Act §§ 36(3),(4)
See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 378-80, 598-99 (2d ed. 1985).
24 The invocation of the "national concern" doctrine in the Supreme Court's decision in R. v.
22
22

Crown Zellerbach 7 DLR (4th) 449 (BCCA 1984); 49 DLR (4th) 161 (S.C. Can. 1988) clearly
expands federal jurisdiction with respect to major issues that affect regions or even all of Canada.
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implied and overarching standard relating to reasonableness of result. 5
Even a cursory analysis of the Canadian laws tends strongly to the
inference that we should go back to the beginning, reintroduce the rule
of law by setting out express, workable standards in the statutes and,
accordingly, subject the public administrators to judicial review of their
exercise of discretion. That model, an analogue of the economic regulation model, appears seductively simple, implying only that administrators must set up and adhere to fair procedures, maintain a record and,
if called upon to do so, demonstrate that they exercised their discretion
in any specific case on a reasoned basis.
Unfortunately, like many analogues, the economic regulation
model does not fit social regulation well. In the United States it has led
to a system which leading critics have castigated as "extraordinarily
crude, costly, litigious and counterproductive", 26 and which appears to
empower the courts and counsel for the litigants in contested cases to
dominate or even capture the public policy agenda. That the system
works with even limited effectiveness by leading to a "bargained accommodation" depends in large part on ignoring the formal legal system and relying instead on bargaining among the regulators, the regulated and other interested parties. 28 And that the system thus works in
spite of the formal legal model is confirmed by an incontrovertible authority, who states that "[iun real world situations Americans balance
environmental values against other values, as does the Environmental
Protection Agency, whether or not the law specifically allows it to so
declare publicly". 9
21

Section 22 of the Waste Management Act sets out a "reasonable grounds" requirement

that confines the administrator's exercise of discretion to a case he must document and prove is
reasonable. That section is, however, only an enforcement section relating to making a mandatory
cleanup order.
An interesting feature of that Act is the right of appeal under § 28 to an appeal board, which
certainly provides for broader review of the case than would obtain under common law judicial
review standards. But because there are no substantive standards - only discretionary powers set
out in the key prohibition and permit provisions - presumably the appeal board will only reverse or
remand if there has been a breach of due process or no reasonable grounds disclosed to justify
what appears to be an arbitrary decision. See S.A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATION ACTION 249-51 (3d ed. 1973).
In any case if, as usual, a "standard" is prescribed by rule in quantitative - or even qualitative rules - no judicial review is available.
26 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1333 (1985).
2" See RICHARD B. STEWART, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1802-05 (1975); RICHARD B. STEWART, Controlling Environmental Risks through
Economic Incentives, Columbia University Colloquium on New Directions in Environmental Policy, 10-11 (1987).
28 RICHARD B. STEWART, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 655, 660-70.
26 William D. Ruckelshaus, Preface to U.S. Environmental Laws (BNA) xxxvii (1986). Mr.
Ruckelshaus was Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for two terms, 1970-72

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:315 1993

CANADIAN POSITION

If the U.S. system of environmental regulation works despite the
formal legal system, where does that leave Canada? The U.S. statutes
at least set out standards which, under a sophisticated system of judicial review, can be relied on by parties in interest to constrain any biased or arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of administrative discretion.
That may tend to tie the system up in legal knots from time to time or
even most of the time; but, when coupled with constitutional protection
of property rights against arbitrary confiscation, it shields individuals
and corporations from arbitrary action by governments reacting to public hysteria.
In Canada a corporation is not entitled to claim any constitutional
protection of its property rights, even where the effect of a statute is
outright expropriation of its property.3 0 Canada adopted the environmental regulation model developed in the United States; but Canada
omitted the key element of the U.S. system, particularly constitutional
protection against takings effected by statute, express statutory standards and judicial review of agency rule-making, that achieve some even if not an ideal - balance among the parties in interest through the
judicial review process.
What we have in Canada is, at least in the formal laws, an extraordinarily autocratic system: standards are determined by the executive (cabinet and public officials); the conduct rules are set out in the
laws as strict prohibitions; they may be amended through the permit
system by public officials who are not constrained by specific regulatory
standards; and any breach of the prohibitions by a party that has no
permit exemption is subject to very harsh penalties that bear the
stigma of violation of a criminal law. Complicating the system further
is a patina of legitimacy conferred by advisory councils 3l and the right
to review and comment on proposed regulations,3 2 which implies some
reasonable consensus but which operates largely to protect the administrators from making a technical or logical gaffe.3 3
and 1983-85.
'o See HOGG, supra note 23, at 745-49.
s' See, e.g., Canadian Environmental Protection Act § 5, (1988) (which empowers the Minister to appoint advisory committees and to establish their terms of reference. Advisory committees are not necessarily undesirable, but their effectiveness depends on a reasonable balance of
representatives who have some bargaining power and, as a corollary some real influence on policy
decision-making.)
32 Again, the right to comment on proposed regulations is always desirable, but is unlikely to
have any influence in substance unless, as in the U.S., the regulation-making process is also subject to judicial review in accordance with standards which invalidate a regulation that is ultra
vires, arbitrary or unreasonable. See BERNARD SCHWARZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 151-53 (1976).
" See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992) (where
the author points out that even in the notice - and comment - rulemaking procedure has been
relegated ". . .to making a record for judicial review".)
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One commentator, who is critical of the U.S. system of centralized
"planning" with respect to environmental regulation imputes the U.S.
problem to ". . .the size of the United States, the relatively low esteem
accorded government administrators, the adversarial relations between
government and business, and the extensive resort to litigation". He
further speculates that the problem is less serious in other countries
because ". . .other industrial democracies are smaller; regulatory requirements are determined through informal consultation between business and administrators who are generally respected and trusted; and
litigation is infrequent".34
That distinction may be valid for some other countries, but it
clearly does not apply to Canada, in which public interest is whipped
up by media event managers, which is larger in surface area and even
more diverse than the United States, and which has adopted an autocratic regulatory system that renders consultation a formality and judicial review an improbable event.
BARGAINING MODEL

A number of Canadian scholars, who have published thoughtful
papers dealing with the problems of the present system of environmental regulation in Canada, have recommended review and, where necessary, modification of underlying institutions to make possible effective
bargaining among the parties in interest. 5 Influenced by a popular text
on negotiating 6 their thesis is that the basic decision-making institutions should be restructured to better balance bargaining power, that
the parties in interest should become thoroughly knowledgeable about
negotiating techniques, and that the negotiators should be empowered
to make "contracts" which set out a consensus solution.
That is an interesting and constructive thesis, but it largely begs
fundamental
question by assuming it is possible to balance negotithe
ating power among several parties. The obvious analogue is the collective bargaining system. There, however, balancing power is, if not
straightforward, clearly feasible. By giving the employer the right to
lock out and the employee the right to strike and picket, a maximum
tension model is created. Either party may invoke its ultimate weapon,
3 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Protection 44-45 (1987) (manuscript of article prepared for the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences).
"I Anthony Dorcey, Techniques for Joint Management of Natural Resources: Getting to
Yes, in MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES IN A FEDERAL STATE 14 (J. Owen Saunders ed. 1986);
BJ. BARTON, ET AL., A CONTRACT MODEL FOR POLLUTION CONTROL (1984); Dorcey & Rick,
Negotiation-Based Approaches to the Settlement of Environmental Disputes in Canada, in Proceedings of Conference on The Place of Negotiation in EIA Processes: Institutional Considerations, Canadian Environmental Assessment Research Council, Toronto (19-20 Feb. 1987).
36 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO

GIVING IN

(Bruce Patton ed., 1981).

YES:

NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
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but knowing its use can be self-destructive each party is highly motivated to reach a settlement. In short, the regulatory statutes create the
right incentives.
In the context of an environmental regulation dispute there are
frequently several parties in interest - government agencies (federal
and provincial), industry, environmental interest groups, aboriginal
groups, and even local property owners. Given that the objective of the
exercise is to reduce an actual or perceived source of pollution at the
polluter's cost, which usually implies "internalizing" the cost within a
manufacturing firm, it is only the firm that has anything to lose. The
other parties can only gain. What incentives can possibly be devised
that can compel the parties to negotiate effectively? The scholars who
have promoted the negotiating model have identified these problems
but fall short of setting out workable solutions.
The bargaining model is especially attractive in the environmental
context, for inherent in environmental regulation is relatively long-term
social and, impliedly, economic planning among political decision-makers, public service program administrators, industry and interest
groups. And as William Ruckelshaus states, that occurs in spite of the
strict language of the regulatory laws. Two Canadian analysts have
stated the point well.
However, one process that has not changed is the reality of the bargaining and negotiation that goes on all the time in the governance of
natural resources. No matter what in principle might be the mode of
decision-making, in practice there always has been and always will be
bargaining and negotiation. Snapshot views of decisions being made
by the courts, cabinet, legislature, boards and bureaucracy give a false
impression of authoritative decision-making. When the dynamics of
the decision-making are observed and seen in their longer term context, then the ubiquitous presence of bargaining and negotiation becomes evident. Authoritative decisions are then seen as points in bargaining and 8negotiations
that are implicit and unfolding over longer
7
time periods.
If there is a bargaining system already in place in the real world,
then what is the problem? In the United States the bargaining system
has survived because of the safety valve provided by judicial review of
administrative action, that is, of the broad discretionary powers exercised by public officials. Recognizing that social regulation is different
from economic regulation, the courts have restructured the review process in three ways: (1) as in Canada the right of interest groups to
initiate or intervene in court proceedings has been broadly expanded;
(2) the courts impose ever more detailed and demanding procedures on
public officials to urge them to achieve statutory goals effectively, sub"

Dorcey & Rick, supra note 35, at 8.
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ject to allowing full participation of interest groups; and (3) the courts
apply a "hard look" to judicial review, requiring the parties to build
into the court record detailed analyses of extensive data by experts as
well as the arguments of each of the parties.3 8 The result is a system
that is complicated, slow, costly to the parties, and ineffective, both
with respect to refining policy and making practical investment
decisions.
In Canada the administrative process has been complicated by the
grant of standing to interest groups to intervene in judicial proceedings
and, increasingly, the "hard look" approach toward resolving economic
and social regulatory problems. But those judicial innovations can have
little effect on the present system of environmental regulation because
of the two flaws in its foundation: first, the lack of substantive standards in the enabling statutes; and second, what is really a corollary of
the first, the virtually unfettered discretion of the executive (cabinet
and public officials) to make policy by regulation that is not subject to
judicial review.3 9 A perspective of the present bargaining situation can
best be seen by a quick survey of the Canadian "real world".
*A scientist will publish an article expressing concern, for example,
about some chemical used or produced by an industry. Interest groups
pick up the concern, expand on it and stage media events to dramatize
it as an imminent crisis.' ° As a result, the public becomes concerned
irrespective of whether the risk of harm is real or purely speculative.
The government then conducts polls, identifies the public concern, and
resolves to take decisive action.
*The legislature passes a general statute prohibiting pollution which
omits express conduct standards but delegates broad power to the executive to make regulations and to exempt persons from the general
prohibition in accordance with "negotiated" permits, any contravention of which is treated like a criminal offense and is punishable by
large fines or imprisonment or both.
*The Cabinet, after "consultation", promulgates regulations which
contain detailed, quantitative standards that have an aura of scientific
validity but that are usually, at least by implication, driven by technology-based "best available technology" standards rather than pollution-based "risk of harm" standards based on risk analysis and costbenefit analysis. This is the essence of "technology-forcing, command
and control regulations.
*Public officials "bargain" with respect to the issue of permits, which,
See Stewart, supra note 28; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 26, at 1333, 1336-40.
For a brief comparison of English and U.S. laws relating to judicial review of administrative regulation-making, see B. SCHWARZ & H. WAnE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 91-92
(1972).
40 The usual iteration is from issue, to dispute, to interest group conflict, to government mediation, to a staged confrontation for TV production, to crisis, and finally to action by government
as a crisis manager. It is in this context that governments say they do not lead, they follow.
"
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by statute, are required as a condition of continuing to run an existing
mill or to build a new mill.
-Having established a regulatory benchmark the officials then press, in
accordance with their overall plan, to improve the environment on the
ground, for example, that the mill using the chemical has been materially altered and impliedly is increasing the risk of harm to the environment or people or both. To buttress their requests for action, the
officials refer obliquely to the punishing sanctions in the statutes.
*Unsure of the correct priorities for environmental cleanup, uncertain
about the correct production process or abatement technology required to meet the more stringent standards, and uneasy about the
required allocation of capital, industry managers temporize.
-Rival federal and public officials, determined to demonstrate who are
the "tougher" enforcers, publish or "leak" documentation indicating
that specific mills are in violation of their permits (originally issued
pursuant to the officials' discretionary powers), insist on strict compliance, and even initiate prosecutions.
*The press publishes this information, characterizes the managers as
"scofflaws" and demands immediate action.
-Interest groups force a dramatic, televised confrontation.
-Finally, under great pressure from government the managers, however uneasy about the investment, capitulate, then hold their breath
until the next concern becomes topical.
That is indeed a form of bargaining. But it is not bargaining in the
sense of arriving at a consensus or a contract. Instead, it is an insidious
form of plea bargaining where firms yield to the requirements of public
officials in order to avoid the opprobrium of prosecution as criminals.
The discretion the public officials exercise is not administrative discretion but, directly or indirectly, prosecutorial discretion. It is an undesirable form of bargaining in a context where public officials, as monopolists, exercise broad discretionary powers to make the rules and then
threaten prosecution for breach of those rules. Indirectly, public officials thus determine how business firms must allocate available capital,
taking priority over research, product improvement, process innovation,
and investment in new, more productive capital goods.
It is in this sense that such social regulation takes on the character
of "economic planning" and that distinguishes it clearly from economic
regulation designed to make markets work more efficiently. Conceptually, such planning is clearly undesirable but it is the real world in
which industry operates. It is, relative to the area of economic regulation, irritatingly autocratic; but there is behind environmental regulation, if not logic, a general feeling that government must do something
to remedy our general abuse of the commons.
Trade law regulation, however, does not even have the distinction
of doing social good. It is the superimposition on market economics of
mercantilist principles, a naked exercise of political power under a thin
veneer of an avowed search for "reciprocity" or a "level playing field".
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It is not only autocratic, it is anachronistic.
TRADE LAW CONCEPTS

Although not always characterized as such, the competition laws
and international trade laws can all be subsumed within the generic
concept of fair trade practices. The competition laws tend to be confined to acts in or adverse effects felt within one country, whereas the
international trade laws deal with similar issues across borders.
In this context the concepts of "incremental pricing", "price discrimination", "predatory pricing" and "dumping" tend to be used
somewhat loosely. The discussion here attempts - if not to define - at
least to explain and limit the boundaries of these concepts.
(1) "Incremental pricing" means that a firm, which has excess production capacity remaining after demand in its local (or "normal")
market is fully satisfied, sells into an outside market at a lower price
in circumstances where that lower, external price has no adverse
"shadow effect" back on the local market. It does that to achieve
greater operating leverage, that is, lower unit costs of production by
operating at closer to 100% of the pertinent production mill's rated
capacity. Thus, to the extent the lower external price exceeds its average variable costs ("cash costs"), it earns a contribution to payment
of its fixed costs ("overhead") and accordingly reduces unit production costs on its total production.
In any one domestic market "incremental pricing" is a desirable
phenomenon. Indeed, it is the pricing logic that in the short run forces
the domestic price level down to the marginal cost level, that is, the
level of the variable or cash costs of the least efficient producer that
can remain in production at that price level.
It is not necessarily desirable, however, between two national
markets where those markets are not totally integrated. For example,
assume U.S. market demand for Product X is satisfied by five large
U.S. mills and that Canadian demand for virtually identical Product
Y is satisfied by five smaller Canadian mills which have, because of
smaller scale, higher average total costs of production. Assume also
that the U.S. market for Product X is ten times the volume of the
Canadian market for Product Y. In such circumstances, absent antidumping laws, if aggregate U.S. demand falls ten percent, the
larger, more efficient mills will incrementally price into the Canadian
market and, if import duties are zero and transportation costs the
same, tend to force closure of the Canadian mills. Although in practice the great threat is to Canadian producers from larger U.S. producers, the converse can be true, at least in the short run, particularly
where large Canadian producers could have a like adverse impact in
an industry on smaller, fragmented U.S. producers. Thus, incremental
pricing can have a harmful - indeed devastating - effect on competi-

tors, even eliminating them in extreme cases. As a result, legal constraints on incremental pricing or dumping has some demonstrable
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merit.
(2) "Price discrimination" is a legal concept of dubious distinction but
is firmly entrenched in both Canadian and U.S. competition laws.
What it requires is that a producer sell its like product at a like price
to like buyers who compete in one geographic market, except, at least
in the U.S., where the producer can justify a lower price to one customer on efficiency (scale of production) grounds or on the ground he
lowered the price in good faith to meet a competitor's price.
Thus, price predation, which is based on intent to drive a competitor out of the market, is only indirectly in issue. The ostensible object
of the price discrimination law was to shelter smaller customers of the
producer from being eliminated by larger customers with the effect of
increasing concentration and market power of the larger customer in
the relevant market. The practical effect of the price discrimination
laws is to compel competing sellers to maintain the product price at a
level which shelters the smaller customer from competition. As a result, the competition law is applied not to further competition but to
restrain it, maintaining a price umbrella over the inefficient customers. Price discrimination, therefore, is in effect the antithesis of incremental pricing. The first concept artificially props up the price level,
whereas the second, incremental pricing, drives it down.
(3) "Predatory pricing" goes beyond price discrimination and even beyond incremental pricing. It means pricing at a low level with the
objective of driving a competitor or competitors out of the market,
achieving effective power in that market, and, inevitably, raising
prices in that market to recover the costs of the original price war.
Hence, the near synonym "monopolization".
(4) "Dumping" while it can in rare cases mean predatory pricing
within a producer's domestic market, 41 normally means incremental
pricing across national boundaries. The acid test is selling a product
in the foreign market over a sustained period at a price lower than the
domestic market price. It rarely involves predatory pricing because in
nearly all international trade cases, assuming balanced supply/demand, import duties and greater transportation costs, a producer's net
sales value ("net mill return") will be greater with respect to sales in
its domestic market. The domestic producer has little incentive, therefore, to have as its objective the elimination of any foreign competitor,
even if that is a consequence of its action. Moreover, it usually has
little chance of recoupment as there are usually several actual or potential entrants.
The boundaries between the concepts of "price discrimination",
"predatory pricing" and "dumping" have become blurred, particularly
in U.S. law, because of the evolution of the dumping concept in U.S.
international trade laws. Originally it was a predatory pricing concept,
requiring proof not only of selling in the U.S. at prices lower than the
41

(Can.).

See, e.g., Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. ch. C-34 as amended § 50(1)(b) (1985)
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price in the impugned producer's domestic market but also of specific
intent to eliminate one or more weaker producers to acquire market
power and so injure competition, i.e. reduce competitiveness in that
market in the long run.
That provision, because of the difficulty of proof of intent, proved
to offer little protection to the industries which sought it. Congress
therefore amended the dumping concept to eliminate the requirement
of proving specific intent. What remains is thus an analogue of price
predation. But it is an analogue only in that it does not require proof of
intent to eliminate a competitor. It generally requires proof of sales in
the market of import at a (net back or net mill) price lower than sales
in the producer's domestic market with the effect of causing injury to
the producer in the market of import.
In practice, however, "dumping" is a unique concept. It goes far
beyond simplistic "like price" comparisons in respect of like product
sold to like customers in one market under the price discrimination
laws. Whatever analytical process is employed in a dumping case - industry trend analysis, margin (net mill return) analysis, or comparative
economic analysis - the analysis will be much more refined and certainly less realistic than analysis driven by conventional competitive
market analysis. As in price discrimination cases the focus is not on
increasing competition but on confining the conduct of foreign producers to shelter domestic producers from what the law declares to be unfair competition.
Accordingly, irrespective of the analytical technique used by administrators in a dumping case, the focus will be on the apparent adverse impact on and relative decline of the market share or profitability
or both of domestic producers caused by the allegedly unfair pricing
policy of the impugned foreign competitor. To compare "fair pricing"
almost always the administrator of a dumping law will use, as a benchmark, an analysis not just of comparable net mill returns but an analysis of "fair price" margins. Whether a price is fair depends on whether
the impugned foreign producer realizes a fair margin after deducting
from its foreign market price variable costs, imputed overhead costs
(pursuant to a formula), and imputed capital costs. This is a measure
technique that can, in practice, militate against the fair operation of
competitive markets in the sense it substitutes bureaucratic price determination for market-driven, marginal cost pricing.
Thus, it is the application of these analytical tools which give to
the statute administrators broad discretion to determine dumping and
injury to domestic producers, and which, as a result, tend to the
politicization of specific cases.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Even if sometimes exaggerated in the domestic political debates, it
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is clear that even between very competitive markets, if those markets
are not totally integrated into a common market, the dumping concept
fulfills a legitimate function. The argument here assumes that, under
the FTA regime in place, the U.S. and Canadian markets are sufficiently integrated to permit at least partial exclusion of the domestic
dumping laws of both Canada and the U.S.
A number of approaches are possible.
(1) Modify the ADD laws to make them congruent in Canada and
the U.S.A.
(2) Modify the ADD laws to make them, if not congruent with, at
least parallel to the competition laws.
(3) Repeal the ADD laws of Canada and the U.S.A. as they apply to
each other, modify the competition laws of each country to make
them congruent, and apply only the competition laws to dumping
cases concerning only Canadian and U.S. producers.
(4) By convention, set up a simplified antidumping law between Canada and the U.S.A. which reflects partial integration of these markets and which remains consistent with overarching GATT and procompetition policies.
PREFERRED APPROACH

For several reasons, in the short run, the fourth alternative, a new
Canada-U.S. convention, appears to be the preferable alternative. To
make antidumping or competition laws congruent in both countries requires negotiation and settlement of detailed statutory terms between
two foreign legislatures; a formidable if not impossible task. Even more
important, assuming congruent competition laws and the abrogation of
the antidumping laws in Canada-U.S. cases, the competition laws, conceptually, do not deal specifically with the essence of dumping, that is,
incremental pricing by a strong foreign producer on a sustained basis
that injures domestic producers. Although dumping can be a form of
predatory pricing, it is a distinct form of conduct that can and should
be dealt with, at least for a transition period of several years, by fairly
specific standards. In the short run, where one country has a disproportionate number of small-scale plants, the. "intent" element of predatory
pricing normally does not exist and hence there is no legal constraint.
After adjustment to that structural difference, congruent competition
laws would be the ideal solution.
What is highly desirable in the short run is a comprehensive, new
approach, not one that attempts to fit dumping cases into the Procrustean bed of existing domestic competition laws. It should be comprehensive to deal with the key issues of choice of law, choice of legal
forum, standing of a complainant to initiate action, timely administrative procedures, review by the joint Canada-U.S. tribunal set up under
FTA Part 19, and, finally, the recovery of legal costs as a technique to
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discourage harassing actions.
It would be new law in the sense it attempts, without becoming
rule-bound, to set out substantive measurement standards that can be
applied to all cases.
The procedural issues are difficult but realistically achievable.
(1) Standing- any complainant could initiate an investigation, subject
to the constraining effect of being liable for legal costs if the complaint is determined to be frivolous or harassing.
(2) Choice of law: the new convention applies, obviating the choice of
domestic law.
(3) Choice of legalforum: the original jurisdiction to make an investigation and to initiate a prosecution would be the country of the producer alleging injury.
(4) Investigation: administrators in the country where the complaint
is made would have full powers of investigation, paralleling existing
powers under national antidumping laws.
(5) Administrative procedures: these would be set out in the convention, adopting the better elements of U.S. administrative law, particularly the substantial evidence rule and strict time limitations for administrative decision-making. The time limitations are especially
important. In trade cases where national administrators, who inevitably reflect some national bias, to "improve" competitive markets that
are subject to some inherent "imperfections", can use delays to frustrate the entire process. In dumping cases the legal axiom that justice
delayed is justice denied is especially true, for a firm being attached
by dumping derives little consolation from winning in principle after
going into bankruptcy.
(6) Review: instead of judicial review in either country's courts, review of the administrator's action taken would be by the joint tribunal
set up under FTA Part 19, applying the administrative review standards set out in the convention.
(7) Substantive standards: while admittedly a demanding problem,
the setting of substantive standards in a convention that applies
equally to each party to the convention is certainly much less difficult
than enacting congruent competition and dumping laws or harmonizing those laws between two jurisdictions. The objective is to constrain
incremental pricing which is, in theory, desirable to enhance competition but which in practice can be unfair between markets that are not
totally integrated. The essential elements of such standards are as
follows.
(1) All calculations should be denominated in one currency,
preferably the U.S. dollar.
(2) Relatively small transactions (e.g. affecting less than five
percent of the total volume of the product in the complaining producer's market in a three-month period) and a
small-volume of transactions "at market" that cannot affect
the price level (e.g. less than five percent of total sales in
the period in the geographic market) should be precluded as
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de minimis.
(3) The regulations would have attached a table setting out
each term to be included in the determination of total costs,
fixed costs, variable costs, and resulting net mill returns.
Each term would be defined, and any permitted use of averages would be expressly specified.
(4) The analytical focus would be on the impugned producer's
net mill returns from domestic and "foreign" sales, not on
trends in the complainant industry (which may be declining
for altogether different reasons) or on comparative economic analysis employing abstract models to calculate "reasonable" margins.
(5) Sales in excess of the de minimis volume that continue over
three months at a price less than the impugned producer's
average total costs (excluding depreciation) would be
dumping.
Depreciation is excluded from the calculation not only
because it represents sunk capital costs that are irrelevant
to marginal cost pricing but also because, in theory, the
dumping laws should not be used, like the price discrimination laws, to force the price level up to the total average
cost level of the new actor in the market that has high capital costs. To include depreciation in the calculation is to
raise one more hurdle to new entrants in the market and
thus coddle old, obsolete mills.
Even if not a model of Doric simplicity, such a convention, both
politically and legally, is much simpler than the alternatives.
THIRD COUNTRY DUMPING

Although a complicated problem, this issue can easily be encompassed by the proposed convention, treating the issue as analogous to
third country, duty-free components incorporated in products that are
duty free under the FTA in transactions between Canada and the U.S.
Again the tribunal under FTA Part 19 would have final review powers.
SUBSIDIES - COUNTERVAIL

Indeed, if not elegant the convention approach is simple enough to
justify its extension to encompass the countervail issue. Even more than
in antidumping cases, the domestic procedure applicable to countervail
cases is, if not skewed, at least tendentious to the point where a party
charged with misconduct is rarely persuaded that justice was achieved
or even sought. Countervail proceedings are not usually characterized
as competition law cases because they involve a subsidizing country
versus an importing country; but they concern, in essence, unfair trade
practices. A country that subsidizes infrastructure or capital or other
costs of a producing firm colludes with that firm to enable it to compete
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as a potential predator relative to its unsubsidized competitors.
Although the definition of "subsidy" will always be contentious, it
is the kind of problem that has long been dealt with and can be dealt
with consistently and fairly by a court or adjudicative tribunal. The
problem with countervail cases is not so much the substantive issue - or
even the calculation of the amount of the subsidy - as the administrative procedure.
Consider, for example, the following criticisms of any domestic
countervail procedure.
(1) The action is initiated by a petition that ordinarily must contain much data relating to the petitioners and the respondents.
Only the data relating to the respondents are fully verified by
the administrators.
(2) The cornerstone of the investigation is a detailed questionnaire
which can be - and usually is - carefully and tendentiously
crafted to achieve a preconceived policy goal: to protect domestic industry and preserve jobs.
(3) The questionnaire data are aggregated to merge all of a nation's producers, irrespective of geographic region and inputs
and outputs, into one hypothetical firm. This is a Procrustean
bed a firm can extricate itself from, if at all, only with much
difficulty.
(4) The crucial issue of imports causing injury is usually determined by superficial, self-serving telephone surveys concerning
business lost to foreign firms. Thus, causation and injury are
virtually assumed without analysis.
(5) Domestic subsidies to complainant domestic firms are deemed
irrelevant, however outrageous, relative to any subsidies received by the impugned producer.
(6) Separate regulatory tribunals determine different issues on the
basis of separate records.
(7) The agency that conducts the initial investigation, which usually precludes any petition, frequently acts later as the court to
make the final injury decision.
(8) The U.S. hearings at which oral presentations are made, in
contrast to those in Canada, are largely a formality because no
cross-examination of witnesses is allowed.
(9) There is no appeal on the merits from the decisions of the administrative tribunals, only judicial review of administrative action on the grounds the decision is arbitrary, capricious, the result of an abuse of discretion, or unsupported by substantial
evidence.
(10) Because of the antitrust problems inherent in any negotiations
to settle a trade case, the governments necessarily assume carriage of the action, depriving the respondent firms of effective
control over defense strategy and settlement terms.
(11) Finally, the scarcely objective administrative system is rendered
even less objective by the omnipresent threat of legislative re-
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taliation by lawmakers pandering to local constituencies.
If the dumping issue can be resolved by convention, why not resolve the countervail issue in the same convention at the same time?
The definition of "subsidy" and the measurement of the subsidy
would be pursuant to uniform convention rules that would resolve the
above criticisms, for example, by ensuring that all data used are fairly
representative and fairly scrutinized by all parties in interest; that
subsidies received by the complainant are offset in the calculations;
and that all hearings are fair. Again, review of administrative action
would not be by domestic courts but by the joint tribunal set up under
FTA Part 19.
MEXICO
The convention approach has one further, signal advantage. Mexico has less experience with competition laws and international trade
laws, particularly dumping and countervail laws, and therefore cannot
be expected to contribute much to the debate. If, before the proposed
NAFTA agreement among Canada, the U.S. and Mexico is ratified,
Canada and the U.S. execute an antidumping-countervail convention,
Mexico could be required to accept that convention as a condition of
being a party to NAFTA. For several reasons a new convention which
supplements the FTA, substituting well understood competition law
concepts for discretionary trade law concepts, is the best approach to
deal with what are now characterized as antidumping and countervail
cases. It, in effect, provides for uniform substantive standards and procedures. It obviates the complexities of harmonization of domestic competition laws. And it simplifies the inclusion of Mexico in a comprehensive, tripartite FTA.
CONCLUSION

There are, therefore, better ways to deal with the complexities of
trade regulation than superimposing on that highly politicized system
the vagaries of equally politicized environmental laws. Indeed, to superimpose environmental laws is, in effect, to politicize the global trade
regulatory regime to the point where we would be better off negotiating
fixed tariffs on a comprehensive basis rather than determining tariffs
case by case through emergency, dumping and countervail concepts.
The inherent weaknesses of the international trade laws can be largely
remedied by adaptation of well refined and well understood competition
law concepts. Those weaknesses can only be exacerbated by introducing
into the trade regulation analysis the complicated - indeed, utterly unmanageable - factors relating to environmental and labor laws.
The issue has been elegantly stated by Richard Stewart:
There are. . .major difficulties in determining the social costs of
environmental degradation. Those costs are a function of the harms
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caused by or risks of harm posed by environmental degradation and
the economic value that individuals or societies place on avoiding such
harms or risks. . . .As a result, there will be wide differences in assessment of the social costs of environmental degradation, and corresponding disagreements about the stringency of the measures needed
to internalize those costs to the activities that cause them. . . .There
is no objective, uniform yardstick for measuring the social costs of
environmental degradation that could be used to resolve disagreements between countries like A and B over the appropriate stringency
of environmental measures and determine whether the restraints on
trade imposed by a particular measure
are justified by the environ42
mental harm or risks in question.
The fundamental problem is that environmental regulation standards are purely value-driven. Notwithstanding the enormous complexity of the environmental statutes, the basic policy conflicts are between
two seemingly irreconcilable and largely immovable polar positions: on
the one hand that environmentalism is not a moral absolute and therefore, like preservation of the spotted owl, must be traded off against
other competing values; and on the other that ". . .certain values are
so central to humanity that they must be protected even at a cost to the
larger society". Further, these normative values are offended when one
suggests that they may be "priced". 43
This conflict between relative and absolute values brings us back
to Goethe's Faust, who is redeemed not because he has discovered any
ultimate truths based on absolute values but because he takes concrete
action better to understand himself, other individuals and the world he
inhabits. The future of each nation's economy in an interdependent
global order depends largely on relatively unfettered international
trade, that is, on exploiting each nation's relative advantage rather than
on some perceived absolute advantage, whatever moral absolute is invoked to justify it. It is an enormous challenge to develop a reasonably
balanced, workable solution to trade conflicts alone. To confuse trade
regulation with environmental and labor regulation, that is, economic
regulation with social regulation that is purportedly based on absolute
values, is to set up an insurmountable challenge. Developing an international trade regime within the context of the well developed competi42 Richard B. Stewart, InternationalTrade and Environment: Lessonsfrom the FederalEx-

perience, 49 WASH. &

LEE L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1992).
43 Robert Houseman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. & LEE

L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1992).
Robert Housman's article is a critique of Richard Stewart's article cited in footnote 42. The
two articles bring the conflict into sharp relief and demonstrate clearly why environmental regulation should not be superimposed on trade regulation.
In this context one should also read Alexander Pope's, An Essay on Man, which was published in 1734 and which, in Epistle 2, sets out the frequently quoted admonition that "The

proper study of mankind is man."
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tion law regime almost certainly would elicit fewer value conflicts, be
easier to articulate and, in the world of economic reality, be far more
effective to engender fair trade practices.
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